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Draft Recommendation
on the armed forces, European defence and informing the public
in WEU member counties
The Assembly.
(i) Noting the increasing role information plays in the running of modern-day societies;
(ii) Stressing the importance of providing the public at national and European level with appropriate
information on the issues involved in developing an autonomous and credible European defence policy;
(iii) Concerned that the lack of information about WEU and its Assembly leads to misunderstanding of
their role and place in the European security architecture, as evidenced in the discussions preparatory to
the IGC and the confusion that reigns over the modified Brussels Treaty in relation to the 1998 time frame;
(iv) Recognising the increasingly important role played by the mass media as a tool for communicating
with the public. use of which carries the risk of manipulation of information and disinformation;
(t,) Drawing attention to the increased use of information technology, and in particular the Internet, in
national. regional and worldwide communications;
(t,i) Stressing the need for WEU to adapt to such methods of communication and to master their use;
(vii) Urging cooperation between the Assembly, the Secretariat-General and all WEU bodies involved in
communicating with the general public, for the purpose of securing their presence on the Internet and
using it to establish a Europe-wide computerised data network incorporating security and defence matters;
(villl Stressing the importance of WEU associate members and observers being closely associated in this
process, together with the central European countries that are candidates for accession to the European
Union and NATO. and of acting in conjunction with NATO, drawing on the latter's experience in the
communications field
REcovupNos rHAT THE CouNCrL
l. Develop and implement a communications policy directed towards the public at large, taking
account of the important role of the mass media and the development of computerised communications
systems such as the Internet;
2. Involve the various WEU bodies, the Institute for Security Studies and the Assembly in the deve-
lopment and implementation of such a policy. in such a way as to avoid duplication of resources and a
superfluous profusion of information;
3. Cooperate with NATO and the European Union in the communications field so as to take advantage
of their experience and better inform the various strands of the public about WEU's dual role as the Euro-
pean pillar of the Alliance and defence component of the European Union,
4. Envisage, in conjunction with the Assembly and NATO, making permanent use of the Internet as a
communications tool, by setting up a site on the World Wide Web. managed by the organisation;
5. Keep the public regularly informed about the activities of WEU and its various bodies, with parti-
cular emphasis on the organisation's military activities and manceuvres and its role in European defence
structures;
6. Encourage member, associate member, associate partner and observer countries to use their
communications policies on defence matters to help inform the public in their respective countries about
WEU:
7. Continue and redouble its effort in the context of transatlantic communications policy, paying par-
ticular attention to the main radio and television networks and the American press and essentially direc-
ting that effort at Congress;
8. Support initiatives taken by the central European countries, associate partners in WEU. towards
establishing information centres on WEU, by contributing, under such arrangements as may be defined by
the Council. to their development and work;
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9. Pay particular attention to ensuring that information is available for the public in countries with an
avowed policy of neutrality;
10. Develop communications initiatives directed towards Mediterranean countries that are not mem-
bers of WEU, as well as Russia and Ukraine.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr Benvenuti, Rapporteur)
l. Introductiort
l. Information has become a major factor of
political and economic life in the modern world.
Technological developments coupled with the
process of globalisation of economies have
contributed substantially to this state of affairs.
However the amount of information available is
also a source of disinformation and confusion. We
live in societies which are overloaded with infor-
mation. where increasing volumes of data are
being made available to the public at large via the
press, radio and television channels and computer
networks such as the Internet, making it possible
to follow the development of any national or
international event of major or lesser importance
as it happens. Nevertheless, when it comes to
major political issues, the wealth of information
available does not always serve the interests of
democratic debate and problems tend, for reasons
that are essentially financial. to be presented in a
reductionist manner.
2. The Assembly's Committee for Parliamen-
tary and Public Relations has invariably accorded
importance to such issues in its work. This interest
is reflected in a number of reports, and texts have
been adopted on many occasions encouraging
WEU as a whole to take a lead in informing the
public. These initiatives have achieved some prac-
tical results although it is difficult to measure their
degree of success with any accuracy. The public is
now undoubtedly more familiar with the acronym
" WEU " but analysis of the way the organisation
is presented in the media reveals a degree of
confusion about its role and place in European
political, security and defence structures which is
perhaps due more to the vague and ambiguous
nature of some WEU documents than to a lack of
information likely to affect media relations.
3. References to WEU as the " European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance ", or the " defence
component of the European Union " and other
such concepts help to contribute to WEU's blur-
red image with the general public. Occasionally
slipping these expressions into official communi-
qu6s is not good enough. Explanations should be
given, with concrete examples, of what they mean
in practice. For example, WEU acts as the Euro-
pean pillar of the Alliance when its member coun-
tries' naval forces, working in conjunction with
one another and the NAIO authorities, organise
monitoring of the embargo in the Adriatic Sea.
WEU acts as the defence component of the Euro-
pean Union when its member countries' police
forces do their best to implement decisions of the
Union in relation to the Bosnian town of Mostar.
These are specific examples of the organisation's
dual role of which the public are not really aware,
as they have not been adequately informed.
1. The increasingly important role of radio
and television and new methods of generating and
circulating information. such as the computerised
information network known as the Internet, com-
plicate the way communications on security and
defence matters are handled. Paradoxically, media
resources such as these, intended in principle to
improve access to information, are helping to
remove discussion of these issues from the agenda
by adopting a reductionist approach to them that
places the emphasis solely on the more spectacu-
lar aspects of initiatives in this field. The race for
profitability and audience ratings. industrial
concentration within the sector and the uniform
standards this implies in terms of the way infor-
mation is processed are decisive factors contribu-
ting to the public being kept ill-informed about an
area essential to the existence and cohesion of
European nation states. These developments are
not in themselves solely responsible for this state
of affairs. The pressures involved are essentially
economic. resulting from the competition prevai-
ling in the communications sector at world level.
5. It is up to the relevant institutions to make
best use of the possibilities offered by the many
and varied modern communications systems.
Some, like NATO, grasped the importance of a
permanent media presence long ago. NATO has
now extended this presence to the Internet, inci-
dentally thereby enabling WEU and its Assembly
to have a presence on the net. NAIO is also able
to draw on American experience of communica-
ting with the public and on the influence of the
Anglo-Saxon press, television and radio agencies.
The Gulf war and NATO intervention, followed
by that of IFOR in Bosnia are well-known
examples illustrating the fact. WEU, however,
still does not have a public information policy that
would give it an effective presence in the Euro-
pean media.
6. This is also due in part to WEU's working
methods which are more confidential and based to
a greater extent on consensus than those of erther
the European Union or NAIO. Nor are the mate-
rials of the three organisations comparable 
- 
one
major reason for the virtual absence of a WEU
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communications policy. The Assembly for its
part, in line with orders adopted at the behest of
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions. has greatly increased its public information
activities in relation to plenary sessions, commit-
tee visits and meetings, texts adopted and practi-
cal follow-up action, indeed to the work of the
organisation as a whole. This is a considerable
achievement given the very limited equipment
and human resources available to the Assembly's
press service for carrying out its task.
1 . The member states for their part also have a
duty as regards communication in relation to
security and defence matters. Each country has
information services within its defence ministry
which are responsible for press and public rela-
tions. Their approach to such questions is natu-
rally a national one but issues such as structural
reform of the armed forces in member countries
are fostering a multilateral, European and Euro-
Atlantic approach. Reductions in defence budgets
and the size of the armed forces. the move
towards fully professional armed services, the
redefining of defence priorities that these changes
imply are leading to a less national approach and
greater readiness to cooperate with other allied
countries which find themselves in similar cir-
cumstances. A good communications policy
which gives the public a grasp of these develop-
ments is the way to win its support for a national
and Euro-Atlantic approach to the reforms envis-
aged by the various countries. WEU has a part to
play in this process by helping to inform the
public from a European perspective, a task which
needs to be done effectively and imaginatively
and one that requires an ability to adapt to new
forms of communication.
II. Public opiniort and defence issues
8. It is necessary for the public to be informed
about defence questions in order to enlist its sup-
port for policies conducted by governments in this
area. During the cold war period, East-West
confrontation lent information an ideological and
propagandist slant, each opposing camp being
convinced of the validity of its own stance. Mas-
sive armed forces, sustained defence spending and
permanent mutual support among allied countries
were regarded as essential. In the West, although
intensive intellectual debate and discussion of geo-
political and geostrategic concepts were traditio-
nally in order, they were dominated by consensus
on the need to sustain a major defence effort, both
at national level and in the Atlantic Alliance.
When Europe ceased to be divided into two oppo-
sing blocs, consensus all but vanished and long-
standing positions on defence matters were assai-
led by a new and uncertain international reality
calling for an urgent revision of priorities.
9. The Gulf war and the outbreak of conflict
in former Yugoslavia, first in Slovenia. then sub-
sequently in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,
helped elevate information to the status of actor
on the international political scene since it led at
times to diplomatic and military action. The
.public was sensitised to certain events, eventually
becoming a lever for exerting pressure on govern-
ments. Thus the interests of governments and the
general public virtually coincided over events in
Iraqi Kurdistan, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti, each
taking a similar view of where its best advantage
lay. The reason why emphasis is being placed on
so-called humanitarian missions, why peace-
keeping operations are now being mounted by the
United Nations - although the organisation's
resources are not keeping pace with this develop-
ment - and why the true international decision-
making centres are still - notwithstanding the
facade of unity in the Security Council 
-
Washington, Moscow, Paris. London and Beijing.
is partly that media pressure has swung public
opinion in favour of these types of international
intervention. Most governments have attempted
to meet this demand, although with varying
success, as the example of UNPROFOR goes
to show. Lacking a clearly-defined mandate, it
found itself embroiled in awkward situations
which eroded its credibility among the bellige-
rents.
10. The Gulf war is practically a text-book
example of the part played by information 
- 
and
misinformation 
- 
of the public in international
relations and defence matters. The United
Nations' new role, Iraq's meteoric rise to world
power status (despite the indifferent performance
of its armed forces in the war with Iran), the mar-
vels of modern technological warfare (surgical
strikes which were nonetheless the cause of the
deaths of several thousand soldiers and Iraqi civi-
lians, not to mention the material damage invol-
ved which was not confined to purely military tar-
gets), the media sensation which surrounded the
Patriot anti-missile system, although it was of
limited effectiveness against Iraqi Scud missiles
(the number of successful firings was overstated
and only 97a of interceptions were successful
according to a US General Accounting Office
report)r : such perversions, to give them their cor-
rect title, are but a few examples of the ways in
which the modern media can be manipulated. The
Iraqi authorities made quite deliberate use of such
manipulative techniques during the hostage crisis
or when estimating losses during the conflict. The
common factor in all the images the public world-
wide received of the conflict, and one that illus-
trates in almost anecdotal fashion the role of
modern media, especially television, as an inte-
gral aspect of international relations, is the CNN
l. De_fense Nel's, Vol 7. No. -10,5-ll October 1992, page l0
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logo which has since become inseparable from the
major conflicts and crises of the recent past.
ll. The war in Yugoslavia also gave rise to
excessive media " hype " at times leading to " off
the cuff " reactions from governments during the
initial months of the conflict in Croatia. then in
Bosnia. Direct coverage of events, not subject to
military censorship as in the Gulf conflict. allow-
ed the media to step up pressure, in Europe and on
the other side of the Atlantic, as regards the policy
to be implemented in relation to former Yugosla-
via, without the causes and long-term conse-
quences of the conflict being clearly explained to
the wider public. This led to action taken by the
European Union and the United Nations being
discredited even though both of these organ-
isations cannot pursue their action beyond what
their member states decide. Moreover, govern-
ments that decided to send troops into the field
were not always able to explain clearly to their
fellow-citizens the reasons for and constraints
upon their involvement. It should be borne in
mind that the view of the conflict presented to the
public was to a large extent based on television
footage, with all that implies in terms of time and
profitability constraints.
12. The United States' engagement in the
conflict and the NATO air strikes against Bos-
nian-Serb forces obviously attracted intense
media coverage reminiscent of that of the Gulf
war. featuring displays of sophisticated military
equipment, use of technology and so-called " sur-
gical strikes ", all presented in highly graphic
form suited to television and to other forms of
communication such as the Internet. America's
skill in using modern communication methods
also proved extremely useful later on when the
Dayton Accords were negotiated, given that, des-
pite their ambiguities and lack of precision, they
virtually became a model for resolving present-
day conflicts, from the Middle East to the Aegean.
not to mention Northern Ireland'. The deploy-
ment of American troops in Bosnia in December
1995 had widespread resonance in the media and
on the Internet 
- 
to the benefit, incidentally, of
American firms such as Lockheed Martin whose
C-17 airlift aircraft enjoyed free advertising on
television screens all over the world. while the
Europeans dithered over the fate of the Future
Large Aircraft (FLA).
13. These two conflicts serve to demonstrate
that the way defence questions are dealt with, as a
rule, is governed essentially by strictly military
considerations: need for mobile armies, depen-
dence on advanced technologies, low-detection
aircraft and shipping. intensive use of electronic
means of warfare and satellite images. The whole
corresponds to an American-style model, deriving
2. See, for example the artrcle entitled " Dubhn proposes Bos-
nra-style peace plan ",The Independertt,8 Fetxuary 1996.
in part from the United States' geostrategic posi-
tion between the European and Asian continents
and the worldwide range of its economic interests,
which demands major force projection capability
and image-monitoring of sensitive regions,
(hence the importance of a sophisticated satellite
network). What is true for America does not
necessarily hold good for European countries,
which have a different geostrategic position and
other economic and political interests in the
world. The Yugoslav conflicts, instability in Rus-
sia and in the Caucasus, the problems of arms pro-
liferation and the spread of Islamic fundamenta-
lism in the Mediterranean region, tensions
between Greece and Turkey and minorities in
central Europe are only some of the challenges
WEU member countries are called upon to face at
this very moment 
- 
not from the far side of the
Atlantic but on their own doorstep.
14. Not all countries attach the same impor-
tance to these problems but a coordinated
approach 
- 
at both European and national levels 
-
is necessary for dealing with them. In the first ins-
tance, the approach will be national since the right
of defence is a prerogative jealously guarded by
nation states. France's decision to reorganise its
armed forces in a move towards greater profession-
alism was taken without consulting Germany,
even though both countries are closely involved in
the European Corps, where career and conscript
troops already work alongside one another. An-
other example of this approach is the resumption
of French nuclear testing for military purposes,
which gave rise to reservations and protest on the
part of some WEU member countries. However
such examples are in fact fairly insignificant. In
general terms the trend is towards a " Europeani-
sation " of defence. The European Corps exists in
the flesh and is operational, despite government
indecision on the purposes for which it is to be
used. France and the United Kingdom are coope-
rating in the aeronautics field and cooperation in
WEU on nuclear issues has not been ruled out:
lastly, EUROMARFOR'and EUROFOR are now
operational in the Mediterranean region.
15. On the industrial side. cooperation is
urgently needed in the face of growing competi-
tion from the United States. The Horizon frigate,
the Tigre helicopter, the Helios I and 2 satellites
and the FLA programme are but a few examples
of a European approach to defence issues, not-
withstanding the many ambiguities and uncertain-
ties surrounding the future of these projects. But
for the time being the final decision rests in the
hands of the nation state, and this also applies to
cooperation programmes. Nevertheless every
European country today realises that on its own it
cannot handle the various conflict situations that
either exist or might arise on the continent of
3. El Pa(s,21 Apri 1996.
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Europe. The economic situation. priorities in
terms of a single curency and the fight against
unemployment make it difficult to maintain large
armies and a limitless range of equipment (air-
craft, tanks, satellites. aircraft carriers, etc.) as
France, forced to make drastic choices about
some of its equipment programmes, such as the
Rafale fighter aircraft programme, has now realis-
ed. These quite complicated debates are nonethe-
less still not open to wide public scrutiny through
lack of adequate reporting in the mass media.
16. In this area, the information and public
relations services of the armed forces play an
important role in relation to certain " target "
audiences, such as students or managers in indus-
try, as well as senior civil servants and parliamen-
tarians. Familiarising present and future decision-
makers with various national and European
defence issues is necessary, not to say essential, so
that the problems they raise can be dealt with in
full knowledge of the facts and from a develop-
mental perspective. Most of the larger European
countries are highly attentive to how the public
should be addressed on defence as on other mat-
ters. as the German Defence Ministry's communi-
cations plan, entitled " Bundeswehr 2000 ",
serves to illustrate. (A summary is attached as an
appendix to the present report). Similarly France's
decision to reorganise its armed forces so as to
move towards a higher degree of professionalism
is being accompanied by an information cam-
paign designed to influence public opinion. Such
initiatives are desirable and necessary since
defence is a sensitive instrument and the decisions
taken in the regard have implications for society
as a whole. The choice of equipment. for example,
is indicative of the existence or otherwise of an
industrial policy on armaments and has a substan-
tial impact, economically speaking. on employ-
ment, technological innovation and expotls. Man-
power reductions in the armed forces, which have
been apparent in all WEU member countries since
the late 1980s. have had a knock-on effect on
land-use planning, for example, due to garrison
closures and staff redeployment. Reforms at pre-
sent under way in various countries call for diffi-
cult budget decisions, at times leading to perverse
outcomes. especially if the emphasis is on the use
of the armed forces for humanitarian operations.
A strong manpower presence is extremely impor-
tant in such cases. although manpower is the first
area to suffer the effects of cutbacks.
17. Countries are still tackling these reforms in
an uncoordinated way and it might be time for
WEU to address the specific issues in order to
identify broad principles for strengthening Eur-
ope's defence, while at the same time slimming
down and modernising national armed forces.
However this task can genuinely be made to suc-
ceed only if the public understands the need for
this approach and its underlying justification. The
peace dividend argument still has a great deal of
mileage, despite remaining uncertainties on the
borders of the European states that belong to
WEU or the European Union. Low-intensity
conflicts are the most prevalent and take varying
forms, ranging from open warfare to terrorism; in
some instances they have spread to European
countries. The conflict in former Yugoslavia has
moved into an uncertain peace phase but resump-
tion of hostilities is still possible; lslamic terro-
rism in Algeria has been responsible for action on
French soil directed at France itself. while Ger-
many has to contend with the presence in its terri-
tory of PKK activists who have no hesitation
about resorting to acts of terrorism directed
against the Turkish community. Even between
countries that are supposedly allies, differences
are such that their resorting to armed force, albeit
on a limited scale. cannot be ruled out. Such differ-
ences concern territorial waters (for example the
conflict in the Aegean Sea) or exclusive economic
zones (fishing grounds in the North Atlantic for
example). Greater cooperation between the coun-
tries concerned is required to counter such diffi-
culties, together with a common approach which
each must explain to its own public. This could
help avoid confusion between the policies and
interests of governments which may at times be
prone, under media pressure, to make decisions or
choices that run counter to a common approach.
III. WEU's role in informing the public
18. WEU is regarded as the sole European
organisation 
- 
in the strict sense of the term 
- 
with
responsibility for defence matters. Although
known to specialists in the field, it goes virtually
unnoticed by the media and new forms of mass
communications. The acknowledged primacy of
NAIO and the predominance of the United States
within it leave little room for WEU in the public
eye 
- 
a fact which can easily be verified by per-
usal of daily newspapers or regular viewing of
national and international television news pro-
grammes (CNN or Euronews. for example). The
Organisation cannot be held solely responsible for
this lack of awareness. Governments must also be
responsible for ensuring that their period ofpresi-
dency of WEU and their impact on the Organisa-
tion have a sufficiently high profile to attract good
media coverage. It is certainly worrying to note
that no substantive feature articles appeared in
either of the two major British dailies (The Times
and The Independent) between 1 December 1995
and 31 January 1996 when the United Kingdom
was in the throes of preparing for the presidency
(which started on 1 January 1996).
19. For, unlike NATO, WEU does not consider
it one of its priorities to inform the public and pro-
mote an awareness of the Organisation and its acti-
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vities. However Europe's populations do feel
concern over security and defence matters, if an
opinion poll, taken in January and February 1996
in the 15 European Union member countries and
published in time for the opening of the IGC. is to
be believed. '11%o of those interviewed thought
that there should be a common foreign and secu-
rity policy (CFSP) and SlVo wanted a common
defence policyo. WEU has a role to play in rela-
tion to both and must learn to present itself to the
public at large as offering the best guarantee,
alongside NATO. of peace and stability in Europe.
But to do so, it must take practical steps to make
its mark on European and international media. Its
involvement in operations in the Adriatic during
the period the naval embargo was in force has help-
ed highlight its role, but the experiment was dis-
continued since it implied widening coordination
at sea to land and air. Instead, NATO benefited
from media attention when WEU handed over to
it control of naval operations. Conversely. the
case of Rwanda, in which WEU did not want to be
directly involved, did nothing to enhance the cred-
ibility of its image in the eyes of the public.
20. The Assembly for its part is trying to fill the
vacuum by intensive activity in this sphere, but
the results are still rather modest. Assembly ses-
sions receive relatively limited press coverage
and this focuses almost exclusively on speeches
given by ministers from the larger member coun-
tries or leading international figures. while
debates and reports attract little attention from the
major daily newspapers and press reviews, not to
mention radio and television. These issues have
been discussed and reported in the past by the
Committee, but to little avail. Besides, can it be
said that the public is really interested in issues
discussed in WEU and its Assembly? As mention-
ed earlier, the media can have an important
influence in sensitising public opinion to interna-
tional events and thus constitute a source of pres-
sure on governments. Sometimes, the latter in turn
seek to act through the organisations of which
they are members. such as, for example, WEU.
21. This is precisely what occurred in the initial
months of the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia,
when WEU and European Union member govern-
ments decided both to monitor the United Nations
embargo on the supply of arms to the belligerents
and engage in intensive diplomatic activity in an
attempt to find a solution to the conflict. In terms
of media coverage of these actions, the European
Union quickly attracted wide media attention on
its diplomatic initiative, while WEU seemed over-
shadowed. The handover of command of the
Adriatic operation to NATO and the arrival of a
US maritime air group immediately put the opera-
tion in the media spotlight, which focused mainly
on its military aspects 
- 
aircraft carrier fire-power,
number and capability of aircraft aboard, sur-
veillance by satellite etc. Although US commitment
remained minimal 
- 
since Europeans were pre-
sent on land. at sea and in the air and were moni-
toring airspace and the air bridge for Sarajevo 
-
the US air-sea presence alone attracted daily
coverage in the national and international media
(with CNN at the forefront). Here again. the Amer-
icans showed their ability to make intelligent use
of the possibilities modern communications offer.
22. It will not do to publish a communiqu6 at
the close of Assembly sessions or ministerial
meetings, drawing attention to some decision or
other. for the purpose of keeping the public inform-
ed and encouraging it to feel involved. It is
necessary to see to it that the media are invited to
report on the practical outcome of decisions taken
in the field. This effort is one that must be sustain-
ed and requires development of an information
and public relations policy directed primarily at
radio and television and new communication sys-
tems like the lnternet. Information on WEU, whe-
ther it emanates from the Council. the Assembly
or the Institute for Security Studies. already
enjoys fairly wide circulation in specialist circles;
it is essential that it should now reach the national
and European public, which is already familiar
with the European Union and NATO. Like politi-
cal Europe, defence Europe with all that it implies
for preserving the sovereignty and integrity of
nation states, cannot be built without the agree-
ment of peoples, at national and European level.
Membership of WEU imposes binding obliga-
tions in terms of a common defence, and these are
often entered into rather flippantly, even though
they engage member states directly in actions that
cannot be undertaken without popular support.
23. In fact things tend to carry on as though the
cold war had never ended and world stability were
still based on nuclear weapons. despite the fact
that the international situation is much more
unpredictable today than in the past. In the case of
states owning territories on other continents,
aggression against a WEU member state's terri-
tory could occur outside the framework of
Europe. Would the public in the Netherlands or
Portugal stand for national troops being dispat-
ched to the Maghreb. in the (hypothetical.; event
of one of the countries of the region attacking the
Spanish enclaves and Spain calling upon its WEU
allies? Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty
is entirely unambiguous on this point and the
Treaty. moreover, does not specify geographic
limitations. These are issues that for manv ana-
lysts belong to the world of political make-
believe, as though the fact were established that
the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape of
Europe, and especially the Mediterranean region,
will remain frozen in its present mould for
decades to come. The uncertainty surrounding4. Bullefin Europe, No. 6697, page 5. 28 March 1996
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developments in international relations was
already there in the cold war period. No-one could
have predicted in the early 1980s that the conti-
nent of Europe would, by the end of the decade.
have experienced an upheaval comparable to that
which followed the second world war. The domi-
nant tenor of media-reporting is essentially intend-
ed to reassure the public in WEU and European
Union member countries and focuses on econo-
mic and ecological issues. although the causes of
the conflicts that have arisen in Europe since the
start of the century. which are essentially political
in nature 
- 
for example problems over minorities,
aggressive forms of nationalism and territorial
disputes 
- 
are still very much with us today.
24. It is here that gaps in the information that
reaches the public are apparent, making the adop-
tion of credible policies and the reform of national
and European institutions, whose job it is to tackle
the problems referred to, more difficult. How then
can a European security and defence identity be
built up if the public cannot perceive this as being
in its interest? The same observation can be made
regarding the European Union. How would the
creation of a " Mr CFSP " alter the reality of the
present situation when foreign policy remains the
province of the nation state and consequently
serves national interests, which may on occasions
happen to coincide with those of other European
Union and WEU partners? Although some
governments consider a concerted European
approach towards foreign and defence policy
issues a matter of priority in the framework of the
IGC negotiations. public opinion is still far from
being aware of it, through lack of the right kind of
information. This state of affairs has important
consequences at national level, when decisions
taken at European level must be presented and
adopted either in parliaments or by means of a
referendum. The examples of the Danish and
French referendums on Maastricht serve to reveal
the gap between government decisions and public
oplnlon.
25. In defence matters only WEU and NATO
are in a position to carry out an information cam-
paign of the kind required. However NAIO prio-
rities are directed increasingly at enlargement
towards the central European countries. which are
becoming the main target of its communications
policy, as the validity and usefulness of the
Alliance in principle no longer needs to be justi-
fied to the public in the allied countries. That
leaves WEU, which has to make an effort to
arouse interest in a European defence in the coun-
tries associated with it in various ways. More
regular radio and television exposure and a pres-
ence on the Internet 
- 
currently provided courtesy
of NATO 
- 
can help familiarise the public with
the Organisation, often regarded as a European
Union body. The transatlantic approach to com-
municating information should also be used in
Europe. While it is important to sensitise leading
figures in America to WEU's existence, one
cannot fail to notice the absence of a communica-
tions policy that could influence the major Ameri-
can media companies. A single report on WEU,
broadcast on CNN or one of the other main Ame-
rican television channels, would do far more to
publicise the Organisation in the United States
than any number of conferences and colloquies
directed towards local experts in transatlantic and
European defence who already know about the
Organisation.
26. This presupposes the development of a
coherent and structured communications policy,
encompassing the various WEU bodies and the
Assembly and directed towards a European
public. This is important, both in order to publi-
cise achievements in the framework of coopera-
tion in European defence matters. and also 
- 
and
herein lies the crux of the matter 
- 
to show the
peoples of Europe that there is a need for this kind
of organisation. Public opinion on WEU's image
is still somewhat confused compared with that of
NATO or even the European Union and this
" information shortfall " also affects member
governments. of all statuses. As proof of this, one
need only refer to the discussions preparatory to
the IGC and the references to the 1998 time-
frame. In these discussions, in which it is clear
that the Council of Ministers has the last word,
there is real cause for concern on the part of the
Assembly as regards its role and place in Euro-
pean security and defence structures; nowhere are
these analysed in detail in setting out the various
options for WEU's future 
- 
from maintaining the
status quo to merger with the European Union 
-
not even in the documents produced by the natio-
nal parliaments. It is important that European
defence too should have a responsible instrument
of parliamentary supervision, providing a link
with national parliaments and through them with
public opinion in the various countries.
27. This aspect is paramount if the hope is that
WEU should one day become the true European
pillar of the Alliance. capable 
- 
in coordination
with NATO, in the context of the CJTF (combined
joint task forces) programme'- of mounting peace-
keeping or humanitarian operations requiring
mobilisation of military assets. It will not do sim-
ply to state an intention to strengthen WEU's oper-
ational capabilities or draw up a list of forces ans-
werable to the Organisation (FAWEU). It is
necessary to convince the European public and
taxpayers and the parliaments that vote defence
budgets of the need for and usefulness of such
endeavours. WEU's communications policy
5. This programme involves NATO making its material
assets and logrstrcal support capability available to the Euro-
pean allies in the event of the latter engaging in military oper-
ations in which the Unrted States is not involved.
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should seek to highlight the Organisation's deter-
mination to carry out the role for which it was
created and its ability to adapt to the prevailing
new international geopolitical and geostrategic
conditions. It must also seek to influence public
opinion in all the countries associated in vhrious
ways with WEU, and also on the other side of the
Atlantic. This would strengthen the arguments of
all those in the United States who believe that
consolidation of the Alliance is to be achieved by
the European allies gradually assuming more res-
ponsibility, as opposed to those who feel that the
American taxpayer is paying over the odds to
defend a Europe which is, to boot, an economic
adversary. In promoting development of the trans-
atlantic dialogue, one must not lose sight of the
fact that public opinion is responsible for the elec-
tion of US representatives and senators, who,
unlike many of their European counterparts, have
real powers of control 
- 
and decision 
- 
in US
foreign policy and defence matters.
28. In this connection the presence of WEU
and its Assembly on the Internet6 takes on special
interest at a time when that particular communica-
tions tool is attaining a worldwide dimension and
developing. in the United States as in other indus-
trialised countries. into one of the information
sources most widely used by the general public
and experts. on a par with television. The Internet
offers considerable advantages in terms of cost
and impact of information distribution, as compar-
ed with other communications media. without the
financial constraints of the latter. It could thus be
used by WEU to keep the public informed about
its work and the way it operates. For example,
pictures and commentary are available. via
NATO's information site, on the WEU police
force in Mostar. Bosnia. even though it rarely
receives a mention in newspapers or on television.
The force undoubtedly has scant resources with
which to carry out the tasks entrusted to it 
- 
this
became obvious from the incidents on 7 February
1996 occasioned by hostility shown by a section
of the Croatian population towards the European
Union administrator for Mostar, Mr Hans Kosch-
nik; however it is up to governments meeting in
the Council of Ministers to shoulder their respon-
sibilities and explain to the public what the limits
of the mandate given to the European police force
are. In the absence of such information. all that
will remain is an impression of the powerlessness
of WEU and the European Union, helping to cast
doubt on WEU's real capabilities and the political
will that must govern its actions.
29. To avoid duplication it might be a good
idea for the Secretariat-General and the Assembly
6. This topic is dealt with in detail rn another report which Sir
Russell Johnston is submrtting on behalf of the Committee
entitled " Interparliamentary communrcation and computer
networks in WEU member countries ".
to coordinate all initiatives directed towards esta-
blishing a WEU presence on the Internet. NATO
and the North Atlantic Assembly cooperate in this
way, although legally speaking. there are no offi-
cial ties between them. Another advantage of this
type of coordination would be to give WEU a pres-
ence on international communications informa-
tion networks for only a very small outlay in
terms of human and material resources. In the
coming years, such networks will have an increas-
ingly important role as an information source in
many quarters including governments. Some,
such as the United States Government, are very
active on the Internet. This must not be seen as a
passing fashion but as an opportunity to be invol-
ved in a technological development which has
already had a substantial impact in forming public
opinion, especially in industrialised countries.
Any communications policy WEU adopts, must,
in order to be credible, pay special heed to this
development if the Organisation wishes to be able
to convey the information necessary to publicise
its role within the European security and defence
architecture to as many people as possible and to
present that role clearly.
30. Public opinion is not homogenous. It
represents differing interests and priorities which
complement and contradict one another. Too
much or too little information leads to manipula-
tion, at times at the hands of pressure groups
whose aims, be they political or economic, are
not those of the nation state and its institutions. In
the defence field, the stake future generations
have in policies decided today is too important, in
general terms and more specifically for the pur-
pose of preserving national identities, for respon-
sibility for informing the public to be left solely
in the hands of media professionals. There is a
need for some form of education in this area and
it can only come from governments or institu-
tions mandated by them to represent their collec-
tive interests. such as WEU or NATO. This
implies that there should be a policy of communi-
cating with the ordinary man or woman, not
merely with experts, and that any such policy
should be seen to be capable of adapting to media
constraints and new technologies. Increased
cooperation with NATO in this area 
- 
as is
already happening over use of the Internet 
- 
is
desirable and necessary, as communications bud-
gets have a tendency to shrink in the face of other
priorities such as NATO enlargement or the deve-
lopment of WEU's operational capabilities.
WEU would benefit from more experience and
resources in order to affirm its role as the Euro-
pean pillar of the Alliance in the eyes of the
public in European countries and on the other
side of the Atlantic, thereby contributing to the
development of a true European defence identity
regarded as credible by the governments and
peoples of Europe.
10
APPENDIX DOCUMENT 1523
APPENDIX
The " Bundeswehr 2000 " plan
1. The Bundeswehr's communications policy
takes on its full significance when placed in the
context of the political events Germany has expe-
rienced in recent years. namely, the establishment
of a new sovereign nation and foundation of a
new national community. This policy is likewise
of major importance when directed towards other
states, for Germany, as a result of its borders
having moved towards the east of the continent,
needed to reaffirm that its roots lay in the West
and still finds it necessary to do so to an extent.
This explains the ever-present concern of govern-
ment and army alike to act within the framework
of security alliances (such as NATO, WEU and
the OSCE) and to abide by their rules.
2. In terms of these developments, the direc-
tion taken by the German army's communications
policy is a highly constructive one: the conventio-
nal cold war philosophy has been replaced by an
ethos of support for peace with multinationality,
flexibility and mobility as its corollaries. The Ger-
man army fully recognised the importance of the
media today, which has enabled it to establish a
relationship of trust with the German people and
promote understanding of the foundation and
goals of German security and defence policy.
Above all, the media has made it possible to
achieve consensus on the new role of the army,
especially in Europe. This requires making acces-
sible information which, by its very nature, the
population at large does not normally possess; at
the same time, the latter is becoming increasingly
critically-minded and eager to have such informa-
tion. The relationship the German army has esta-
blished with all sections of the media is practical
and outgoing; it is based on trust and credibility
and aims to be convincing and to reach as wide an
audience as possible. The army press officers
carry out in-depth research and provide the media
with background inlormation.
3. The German army's support for and partici-
pation in the multinational peacekeeping forces in
former Yugoslavia have been the major challenge
faced by the Bundeswehr since its creation. Infor-
mation work contributed to the gaining of accep-
tance for the army's new tasks and the reform of
the Basic Law, and also made it possible for a
general consensus to emerge on actions underta-
ken in former Yugoslavia. There is now a better
perception of the challenges and significance of
security policy, as the results of an opinion poll
carried out in 1995 have shown. 807o of those pol-
led regarded the army and NATO as guarantors of
Germany's external security. The information
department of the ministry of defence places great
emphasis on new computer-based communication
systems: a computerised CD-ROM (compact
disk-read only memory) on the armed forces and
German defence policy has been available since
the beginning of the year, an electronic mail sys-
tem (accessible via the Internet) has been installed
and a Bundeswehr site was brought up on the
Internet in January 1996.
4. Frequent approaches are also made to
other media in a massive drive to inform both the
German people and the wider world, a task in
which the German army has been involved since
1989. No other European country has needed to
undertake communications work on this scale.
with the possible exception of France which this
year is to open a debate on the reforms of its sys-
tem ofnational service. The goal is a new defini-
tion of the Bundeswehr's identity. The " Army
Information 2000 " project is a means of coordi-
nating all the areas of expertise covered by infor-
mation. The army is a full member of the infor-
mation society and is thus in competition with
firms and organisations of all types for the atten-
tion of the public. Public scrutiny is moreover far
from uncritical for the army is still, primarily, an
instrument of power in the hands of the State. To
present the army's new tasks 
- 
as defined in the
1994 White Paper 
- 
and inform younger genera-
tions in a country with large numbers of
conscientious objectors, television slots were
booked and advertising material was broadcast
on the national channels and published in the
press, including the " house magazines " of the
different army corps, up until mid-October 1995.
The various aspects of the project from humani-
tarian intervention to manpower training, and
including NAIO membership and the use of new
detection systems such as AWACS aircraft and
satellites, received high profile coverage to the
accompaniment of the army's advertising slogan:
" Wir sind da " (" We're right there ").
5. Such wide circulation is essential to pro-
duce the desired effect, namely, renewed enthu-
siasm. All army publications are to be updated in
1996 and new publications will appear. There is
also a national telephone number for information
on the Bundeswehr, giving direct access to
various kinds of information. In 1996 the empha-
sis will be on international public relations and
delegations from Bulgaria. Poland, Romania, Slo-
vakia and Ukraine will visit throughout the year.
Similarly, German delegations are to visit Alba-
nia, Chechnya, Lithuania and Slovenia. This pro-
gramme coincides exactly with the main themes
identified for the year, which, together with dis-
l1
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cussion forums on external intervention, peace-
keeping and developments within NATO, project
a strong European emphasis. The development of
the European Union, industrial cooperation on
armaments and joint work within the European
Corps, not to mention strengthening WEU's ope-
rational capabilities, are to be themes for a major
information drive in 1996.
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